

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

File 574

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
[CONTAINS CODEWORD]

INFORMATION

May 8, 1973

NSA Review Completed

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

Cambodian Communist Guidance on
Sihanouk

An intercepted April 16 Cambodian Communist Central Committee guidance (Tab A) on Sihanouk's recent trip to the "liberated areas" reflects the Party's dichotomous approach to Sihanouk and its determination to keep the Prince in his place.

The guidance stated: "The welcome for Sihanouk in the liberated zone is in accordance with our Party's objectives and the political goals of the Front." It went on to explain: "As for Sihanouk and his faction;... we make a front with him and he makes a front with us. This is very excellent and we should definitely carry it out..."

However, the guidance noted that this marriage of convenience has its limits and cautioned that while Sihanouk's views may be openly broadcast, his power (as well as that of "the feudal lords and the capitalists") should not be reinforced by disseminating everything he says within Cambodia. The guidance also calls for building up the Party's position "both over the American imperialists, their lackeys and puppets and over Sihanouk, the feudal lords and their capitalists."

Comment:

We have for some time seen evidence of a mutual distrust between Sihanouk and his non-Communist Peking entourage (i. e. "faction") on one hand and the Hanoi-controlled GRUNK leaders on the other. Sihanouk and his Peking "court" have been kept fairly well under Khmer Communist control -- with the obvious concurrence of the Chinese. Clear evidence of this is the watchdog role played by Hanoi's Ieng Sary who seems to accompany Sihanouk everywhere.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
[CONTAINS CODEWORD]

XGDS (2)

SECRET/SENSITIVE
[CONTAINS CODEWORD]

2

Basically Hanoi and its Khmer Communists want to have it both ways. As reflected in the guidance, they want to exploit any residual popularity Sihanouk might still enjoy (especially in the countryside) without, however, allowing him to build any independent support which causes problems if and when he ever returns to Phnom Penh.

This intercept tends to reinforce our belief that Hanoi (supported by Peking) will not allow Sihanouk to return to Phnom Penh until it is clear that the mercurial Prince can be kept under tight control by a well-entrenched Party apparatus.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
[CONTAINS CODEWORD]